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ST. JOHIN'S LAW REVIEW
legislatures of various states can disagree on the method of solving
this problem, it is submitted that the court's action in the instant case
was improper as an undue usurpation of the legislative function,
especially since it chose the least logical of the several possible
solutions.
CoRPoRATIoNs-Is ACTION TO COMPEL DECLARATION OF Divi-
DEND DERIVATIVE ?-In an action by a stockholder against a corpora-
tion and its directors to compel the declaration of a dividend, the
corporation moved for an order requiring plaintiff to provide security
for expenses, on the ground that the action was derivative within the
meaning of the New York statute.' The motion was granted.2 In
affirming, the Appellate Division held that the present suit is within
the statute since it is an action brought in the right of the corporation,
and not in the personal right of the stockholder.3 Gordon v. Elliman,
280 App. Div. 655, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 671 (1st Dep't 1952).
A "derivative" action, cognizable only in Equity,4 is a suit by
a stockholder to enforce a corporate cause of action.5 As conditions
precedent to its institution and maintenance, the plaintiff must allege
and prove that the corporation has been damaged, and a cause of
action exists in its favor; 1 that a demand has been made, but the
corporation refuses to commence the action; 7 and that he was a stock-
holder at the time of the transaction of which he complains.8 The
corporation, of necessity, is made a party defendant, 9 since the relief
1 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61-b.
2 Gordon v. Elliman, 115 N. Y. S. 2d 567 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
3 Callahan, J., dissenting.
'See Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N. Y. 257, 263, 179 N. E. 487, 489 (1932).
5 See Price v. Gurney, 324 U. S. 100, 105 (1945) ; see Hawes v. Oakland,
104 U. S. 450 (1881) (comprehensive treatment of necessary elements of
a derivative action).
6Waters v. Horace Waters & Co., 201 N. Y. 184, 94 N. E. 602 (1911);
Lifshutz v. Adams, 285 N. Y. 180, 33 N. E. 2d 83 (1941); Moriarty v. James
Butler Grocery Co., 261 App. Div. 20, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 105 (1st Dep't 1940),
aff'd mere., 286 N. Y. 687, 37 N. E. 2d 36 (1941) ; Scheinman v. National Con-
tainer Corp., 165 Misc. 267, 300 N. Y. Supp. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
7 Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U. S. 455 (1903);
NY PA NJ Utilities Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 23 F. Supp. 313 (S. D.
N. Y. 1938) ; see Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52, appeal dismissed, 106
U. S. 3 (1882) (if demand shown to be futile, stockholder may dispense with
it); Dunphy v. Travelers' Newspaper Ass'n, 146 Mass. 495, 16 N. E. 426
(1888) (plaintiff failed to show futility of demand).8 N. Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW § 61 (he may also show that his stock thereafter
devolved upon him by operation of law).
9 Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626 (U. S. 1873) ; see Jones v. Van Heusen
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granted is a judgment against a third person in favor of said
corporation."0
A "direct" action, in contradistinction to a derivative one, is
maintained in the individual right of the stockholder."' Since the
wrongful act of which he complains has caused direct injury to the
stockholder, the fruits of any recovery will inure to his personal
benefit.'
2
The statute invoked in the instant case was enacted to curb the
abuse of the derivative action by petty-interest stockholders, 13 who
prosecuted groundless suits which, because of their nuisance value,
often resulted in unethical private settlements.' 4 The statute re-
quires that a stockholder who brings a derivative action, if he own
less than five per cent of the outstanding stock, unless its market
value exceeds $50,000, must, upon motion of the corporation, provide
security for expenses of the suit.15 The security-giving stockholder
who loses the action is liable to the corporation for expenses. How-
ever, one who holds the required minimum interest in the corporation
need not post security, nor is he liable for expenses to the corporation,
even if he lose the action.' 6 It follows that a small-interest stock-
holder maintains a losing suit at his own expense, while a wealthy
stockholder may maintain a losing suit at the expense of the corpo-
ration. This discriminative feature, inter alia, has subjected the stat-
ute to severe criticism; .7 but notwithstanding this, it was declared
Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 697, 246 N. Y. Supp. 204, 209 (3d Dep't
1930).
10 Cf. Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N. Y. 146, 71 N. E. 2d 443 (1947).
1 See Schreiber v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 98 F. Supp. 106 (S. D.
N. Y. 1951).
12 See General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N. Y. 18, 22, 109 N. E. 96, 97
(1915); Niles v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 176 N. Y. 119, 123-24, 68 N. E.
142, 144 (1903).
13 See WooD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHoLDERs' DERIVATIVE
SuiTs (N. Y. Chamber of Commerce 1944) (enactment of Section 61-b was
based on this report).
14 See Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 294 N. Y. 180, 190, 61 N. E. 2d 435, 439-40
(1945) ; Isensee v. L. I. Motion Picture Co., 184 Misc. 625, 628-29, 54 N. Y. S.
2d 556, 559 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; see WooD, op. cit. supra note 13.
15 N. Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW § 61-b is to be read in conjunction with N. Y.
GEN. CORP. LAw §§ 63-68, which provide for indemnity by corporation to suc-
cessfully defending directors of corooration for their reasonable exoenses in
an action.
18 Isensee v. L. L Motion Picture Co., supra note 14.
17 See Citron v. Mangel Stores Corp., 50 N. Y. S. 2d 416 (Sun Ct.),
aff'd mern., 268 App. Div. 905, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 754 (1st Dep't 1944); Bowes.
Should New York's "Security for Expenses" Act Be Amended?, 2 SYRAcUSE
L. REv. 37 (1950) ; Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How
Far is Californids New "Security for Expenses" Act Sound Regilation?,
37 CALIF. L. REV. 399 (1949) (comparison made between N. Y. and Calif.
statutes); Note, 24 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 395 (1949); Hornstein, The Death
Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALiF. L. REV. 123
1953]
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constitutional in Lapchak v. Baker.18
In the instant case, the court refused to follow an earlier Su-
preme Court decision which held this type of action to be direct.19
Instead, the court labeled it derivative, thereby bringing the action
within the purview of the statute.20 This was predicated upon the
theory that, in respect to dividends, the directors do not owe a duty
to the stockholders as individuals, but only to the stockholders jointly,
that is, to the corporation. This reasoning is specious, tending only
to confuse.
2
'
A derivative action is necessarily based on damage to the cor-
poration.22  The wrongful withholding of dividends is obviously an
injury to the stockholders as individuals, thereby giving rise to a
direct cause of action.23  The theory that the injured stockholders
comprise the corporation, and, therefore, that the corporation has
been damaged, is a rationalization which destroys the classic and
thoroughly well-settled "corporate entity" doctrine.24  This "corpo-
rate entity" exists separate and distinct from the individuals com-
posing it,25 and is thus unaffected by any injury which those
individuals might suffer.
That this is a direct action is further evidenced by an examina-
tion of the recovery obtained. The court will order the directors to
(1944); Legis., 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 326 (1950); PRASHKER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 807, 808 (2d ed. 1949).
i8298 N. Y. 89, 80 N. E. 2d 751 (1948). Contra: Citron v. Mangel Stores
Corp., supra note 17. Similar laws have been enacted in other states: CAL.
CORP. CODE § 834 (1949); N. J. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, c. 3, § 15 (Supp. 1952);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
29 Swinton v. W. J. Bush & Co., 199 Misc. 321, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 994
(Sup. Ct), aff'd nere., 278 App. Div. 754, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 1019 (1st Dep't),
leave to appeal denied, 278 App. Div. 823, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 408 (1st Dep't
1951).20Accord, Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 246 N. Y.
Supp. 204 (3d Dep't 1930) (distinguished in Swinton v. W. J. Bush & Co.,
supra note 19); see 11 FLETCHrER, CYC. CORPORATIONS §§ 5325-5327 (Perm.
ed. 1932).
21 According to this theory, a corporation is comprised of three entities:
the stockholders individually; the stockholders jointly-the corporation; and the
corporation--that invisible, artificial person existing only in contemplation of
law.
22 See note 6 supra.
23 Swinton v. W. J. Bush & Co., supra note 19; accord, Kassel v. Empire
Tinware Co., 178 App. Div. 176, 164 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (2d Dep't 1917) ; see
Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D. Del. 1949);
Starring v. Kemp, 167 Va. 429, 188 S. E. 174, 177 (1936) (stockholders benefit
by the action, while the corporation merely acts as their collecting agent) ; see
BALLANTNE, COR'ORATIONS § 234 (Rev. ed. 1946) (suit is in the right of the
individual stockholders as a class).
24 See Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19, 24 (1930) ; Trus-
tees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636 (U. S. 1819).
25 People's Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 109 Va. 439, 61 S. E. 794 (1908).
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do what they previously should have done-viz., declare a dividend2
The court's decree should have the effect of relating back to the time
when the directors should have done, what they are now being com-
pelled to do; for had the directors performed their duty, a dividend
would have been declared, payment of which could have been en-
forced by the stockholders in their personal right.27 The withholding
of dividends has thus damaged the individual stockholders, and not
the corporation. The stockholders are merely entitled to receive
presently as benefit, what would have been theirs already, had the
directors exercised their discretion properly.
It may be argued that since the legislative purpose of the enact-
ment of Section 61-b was the preclusion of baseless suits, to preserve
this intent, this plaintiff-stockholder should be forced to post security,
since he does not hold the required minimum interest in the corpora-
tion.28 This contention is refuted by the fact that the statute was not
intended to be applicable to an action of this nature, but was designed
to preclude only baseless derivative suits. 2 9
Since the action in the instant case thus appears to be in the
right of the individual stockholders, the present decision is question-
able. This plaintiff-stockholder may be denied a remedy if he is in-
capable of posting the required security.30 Even if he can afford the
security, he may refuse to do so, because of fear of consequential
liability to the corporation in the event he loses the action. The judi-
ciary's interpretation of what constitutes a derivative action, so as to
include the present suit, thereby bringing it within the purview of
Section 61-b, appears, in essence, to be an unconstitutional applica-
tion by the court of a constitutional statute.31 Since the statute itself
is used as a bludgeon on minority stockholders, rather than as an in-
26 "... [E]ven though individual directors are joined as parties, [in ac-
tion to compel declaration of dividend] they are not called upon to exercise any
business discretion. The case has passed that point . . . . [T]he court is de-
daring rights protected by a rule of law, not calling upon the directors to exer-
cise judgment." Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F. 2d 760, 763-64
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 983 (1950).
27See Jaques v. White Knob Copper & Development Co., 260 App. Div.
640, 641, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 326, 328 (1st Dep't 1940).
28 See notes 14, 15 supra. On approving Laws of N. Y. 1944, c. 668, Gov-
ernor Dewey stated in part: "Even if the stockholder owns only a tiny per-
centage or only $5.00 worth of stock, it still should be simple to bring an
action without putting up security. If his action has any merit at all, it
should be easy enough to interest others who do hold at least 5%, or stock
valued at $50,000." GovEaxoa's MEMORANDUX (1944).
29 See WooD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOcKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE
SUITs (N. Y. Chamber of Commerce 1944).
30 Irrespective of his good faith, the action is branded as baseless, if plaintiff
cannot muster sufficient support from other stockholders to defeat the security-
requirement.
31 See Citron v. Mangel Stores Corp., 50 N. Y. S. 2d 416 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
mem., 268 App. Div. 905, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 754 (lst Dep't 1944).
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strument of justice, the instant decision's extension of the theory of
derivative actions, so as to include this direct type of action, is both
reprehensible and inequitable.
EQuITY-PRoPERTY RIGHT IN AN IDEA.-Plaintiff's idea for a
radio program using talented school children was disclosed to defen-
dant with the expectation of compensation should the idea be used.
A program adopting plaintiff's idea was broadcast for over a year
and sponsored by defendant. Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for
the use of his idea. The court decided in plaintiff's favor, and held
that a protectible property right exists in an idea which is original,
novel, and reduced to concrete form, where it has been disclosed under
circumstances indicating that compensation is expected for its use.
Belt v. Hamilton National Bank, 108 F. Supp. 689 (D. D. C. 1952).
The flexible nature of the common law, and its ability to adjust
itself to the changing needs of society,' is evidenced by the gradual
weakening of its original reluctance to recognize a property right in
intangible property.2 The judicial viewpoint has undergone a meta-
morphosis since the days of the Impeachment of Lord Chief Justice
Scroggs 3 for enjoining an admittedly libellous publication because it
injured an intangible right. The once unheard of right of privacy is
now recognized by statute.4 Other intangible property rights not
covered by statute are also protected. Trade names and business
reputations are protected on the theory of unfair competition and
dilution.5 It has been held that a person has a property right in
personal letters, 6 and in the protection of his good name. 7 Trade
I See Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N. E.
206, 210 (1935).
2 See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442
(1902) (refusal to enjoin the printing of plaintiff's picture) ; Hodecker v.
Strickler, 39 N. Y. Supp. 515 (Sup. Ct. 1896) (refusal to enjoin unauthorized
use of plaintiff's name); Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige 24 (N. Y. 1839) (libel-
lous publication did not injure tangible property right); Prudential Assur.
Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10 Ch. App. 142 (1875) (refusal to enjoin a libellous
publication).
38 How. St. Tr. 197 (1680).
4 N. Y. Civ; RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51.
5 See Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F. 2d 348 (9th Cir. 1946);
Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp. 459(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1st Dep't 1932),
aff'd iner., 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30 (1933).
6 Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N. E. 109 (1912) (plaintiff may re-
strain the publication of personal letters); Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36
Eng. Rep. 670 (1818).
7 Niver v. Niver, 200 Misc. 993, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
27 ST. JOHN'S L. Rzv. 144 (1952).
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